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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KEVIN WRIGHT KILLIAN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020455-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001), in the Eighth Judicial
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson,
presiding. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did defendant receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel who declined
to importunately malign police officers or assert an untenable statutory defense? A claim of
ineffective assistance raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v
Maestas, 2000 Utah App 22, f 11,997 P.2d 314 (citing State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618
(Utah App 1993))

STATUTES AND RULES
The following determinative statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A:
Amendment VI, United States Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1998);
Rules 23B and 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Kevin Wright Killian, was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol ("DUI"), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (R. 32-33). The information
additionally charged that defendant had been convicted of four previous violations of section
41-6-44(6)(a), which enhanced the DUI charge to a third degree felony (R. 32-33). The trial
court appointed counsel for defendant (R. 12).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence on the ground that his arrest was a police
"setup" in which officers allowed him to drive knowing that he was intoxicated (R. 27). The
trial court denied the motion (R. 39).
A jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 95, 97). The trial court sentenced
defendant to a statutory zero-to-five-year term, but suspended the sentence and placed him
on supervised probation for three years, specifically directing that defendant serve 180 days
in jail and not consume or possess alcohol during his probation (R. 114-16). Defendant
timely appealed (R. 119, 123). * Defendant's trial counsel withdrew and his appellate
counsel entered her appearance (R. 143, 162).
1

One week after he was sentenced, defendant consumed alcohol in violation of his
probation (R. 125-30). The trial court sentenced defendant to one year in jail and
continued his probation for thirty-six months (R. 138, 159).
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On September 1, 2001, Roosevelt City Police Officer Ammon Manning, a six-year
law enforcement veteran, was eating lunch at Pinn Willies with Utah Highway Patrol
Trooper Stradinger, and off-duty Deputy Tucker. Pinn Willies is a gas and convenience store
on Highway 87 between Altamont and Duchesne (R. 165:71-72, 74). Defendant entered the
store, and, after using the restroom, picked up a twelve pack of Budweiser and purchased it
from the clerk (R. 165:72-73, 81-83, 93). Officer Manning became concerned when he
smelled alcohol coming from the general area defendant had occupied (R. 165:72-73,78-79).
Officer Manning also noticed defendant's eyes were "glassy," a symptom of "someone under
the influence" (R. 165:80). Officer Manning shared his concern with Trooper Stradinger that
defendant might have "been drinking" and be intoxicated and asked his fellow officer to see
if defendant was about to drive (R. 165:73, 94). Trooper Stradinger exited the store to talk
with the defendant, but found defendant had already gotten into his truck and driven away
(R. 165:73,94,124). Because his patrol car was blocked by Officer Manning's car, Trooper
Stradinger 's pursuit was delayed until Officer Manning moved his car (R. 165:73, 94-95).
When Trooper Stradinger pulled out of the store lot and onto Highway 87, defendant
was already out of sight (R. 165:73, 95, 124-25). Proceeding in defendant's direction,
Trooper Stradinger, followed by Officer Manning, located defendant driving about two miles
away on an intersecting dirt road (R. 165:73, 95-96, 125-26). When Officer Stradinger

2

The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \2, 25 P.3d 985.

3

caught up with defendant, he activated his red and blue emergency lights to initiate a traffic
stop (R. 165:96). Defendant continued to drive another two-tenths of a mile until he reached
a residence, where he stopped. All the while Trooper Stradinger's lights continued flashing
(R. 165:96, 132-33). Defendant exited his truck and Trooper Stradinger met him between
the two vehicles (R. 165:97). Trooper Stradinger detected alcohol coming from the
defendant as he approached him (R. 165:98). The officer explained to defendant that he
stopped him because Officer Manning had "detected the odor of alcohol about his person"
(R. 165:97). Defendant acknowledged that he had "partied pretty hard" the night before (R.
165:119).
After explaining the reason for the traffic stop, Trooper Stradinger conducted field
sobriety tests to determine whether defendant was impaired by alcohol (R. 165:98). Those
tests were "the standardized national recognized tests which are the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test which have to do with the eyes, and the one leg stand, and the nine-step walk
and turn" (R. 165:98). On the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, defendant received "all six"
points out of a "possible negative score of six" (R. 165:98-100). Defendant was unable to
satisfactorily complete the one leg stand test, raising his arms contrary to instructions and
failing to extend his leg for the full thirty seconds or to count correctly, missing numbers
"11" and "17" and counting "22" twice (R. 165:101). Defendant performed the nine-step
walk adequately, but his ability to follow instructions, as with the other tests, was "poor" (R.
165:102). Officer Manning, who had followed Trooper Stradinger, video-taped the one-leg
stand and nine step walk, which was played to the jury (R. 165:74-75, 106-07). Based on

4

the smell of alcohol coming from the defendant and his performance on the field sobriety
tests, Trooper Stradinger concluded that defendant had "too much alcohol in his system to
safely operate a motor vehicle" and was therefore "in violation of Utah State Code 41-6-44
for driving under the influence of alcohol" (R. 165:103-04). Trooper Stradinger placed the
defendant under arrest and transported him to the Duchesne County Jail (R. 165:104, 107).
While in jail, defendant voluntarily submitted to a breathalyser test (R. 165:107-09,
154). Trooper Stradinger, certified to operate the jail's "Intoxilyser 5000," administered the
test (R. 165:109-10). Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Halfcock, a breath alcohol
technician responsible for maintaining the Intoxilyser 5000, testified that that machine was
working properly on September 1, 2001 (R. 165:157-160). The results of the breathalyser
showed defendant's alcohol blood level was .169, more than twice the legal limit of .08 (R.
165:107, 113,162; State's Exhibit 4). After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted
drinking half a bottle of vodka and a 12-pack of beer between 9:30 p.m. the night before and
6:00 a.m. that day (R. 165:114-16).
Defendant, following consultation with his counsel, chose not to put on a defense (R.
165:170). The jury found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (R.
165:190-191). The prosecution then presented evidence of defendant's convictions for
driving under the influence of alcohol in 1993, 1994, 1997, and 1998 (R. 165:192-201;
State's Exhibits 10, 11, 13, and 14). The jury found defendant guilty of two or more prior
convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol within the past ten years, which
enhanced the current conviction to a third degree felony (R. 165:203-204).

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defense counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to argue at trial that the police
"set up" defendant for a DUI arrest by allowing him to leave Pinn Willies knowing that he
was intoxicated, or in choosing not to request an instruction on public intoxication. The
record shows that counsel made a reasonable and conscious decision to abandon at trial any
attempt to seriously malign the character of testifying officers. Additionally, there was no
rational basis to support instructing the jury on public intoxication, where the evidence was
overwhelming that defendant was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. This
Court may even decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim because defendant has
not only failed to bring up or further develop a record demonstrating his counsel's deficient
performance, but has also failed to adequately argue that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
performance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS COUNSEL
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning
at trial the theory espoused in his motion to suppress evidence, that the police "set up"
defendant for a DUI arrest by allowing him to leave Pinn Willies even though they knew he
was intoxicated. Defendant argues they should have instead arrested him for public
intoxication. Aplt. Br. at 7-11. The claim is meritless.
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must show
6

that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists a reasonable
probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more
favorable to [defendant]." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 21, 9 P.3d 777 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984)).

To prove deficient

performance, "appellant must demonstrate that counsel's actions were not conscious trial
strategy, and that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions."
State v. Windward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but
must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Coonce., 2001 UT App 355, H 18, 36 P.3d 533
(quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)).
Contrary to defendant's claim, defense counsel appears not to have abandoned, but
rather argued, substantially the same theory at trial as she is alleged to have argued at the
suppression hearing. At the suppression hearing, counsel moved to suppress evidence on the
ground that defendant's arrest was a "setup" because the officers let him to drive knowing
that he was intoxicated (R. 27). As set out below, defense counsel at trial very ably and
doggedly again developed the theory that the police essentially acted in bad faith and might
have "setup" defendant.
Cross-examining Officer Manning, counsel tried to elicit from him that he knew
defendant to be a drinker (R. 165:79). Officer Manning initially replied that in the five and
one-half years he had been a police officer in Duchesne County, he had never heard from
other officers that defendant drank and that he viewed defendant as he would any other
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citizen (R. 165: 79-80). Counsel then sought to discredit Officer Manning by pointing out
that he had mentioned that defendant also had "glassy" eyes for the first time on crossexamination did he observe (R. 165:80-81). Counsel also elicited from Officer Manning,
through sustained questioning, that he apparently remembered defendant's movements in the
store much more distinctly than he did any of the other customers' or his fellow officers'
even before the officer smelled alcohol on defendant (R. 165:83-90). Counsel tried to
suggest that Officer Manning knew defendant was driving toward a residence known for
drug and alcohol problems (R. 165:86-87). When counsel directly asked what made Officer
Manning notice defendant particularly, Officer Manning acknowledged that he was familiar
with defendant (R. 165:87-88). Counsel then returned to the officer's initial denial about his
ignorance of defendant's alcoholism and elicited a retraction, in which Officer Manning
acknowledged that he was "familiar in a vague way with the idea that [defendant] might be
associated with drugs and alcohol" (R. 165:88-89).
Counsel also explored whether Trooper Stradinger knew defendant to be an habitual
drinker, but was only able to elicit that the trooper was relatively new to the area and had no
special knowledge of defendant (R. 165:121-23).
Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertions on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 8-10, trial
counsel presented in closing a rational defense of which police bias was the most prominent
component. The theory of the defense was that defendant was not intoxicated (R. 165:187).
In support, counsel argued that defendant did not respond to Trooper Stradinger's emergency
lights because the road was too narrow to safely pull over, that instructions for the field

8

sobriety tests were hastily given and that evaluation of the test is "very subjective," that
defendant's demeanor clearly indicated that he did not believe himself to be intoxicated, and
that the breathalyser test was fully compromised by defendant's not having eaten for many
hours (R. 165:184-87).
The initial and most fully developed part of defendant's defense, however, was that
Officer Manning simply decided defendant had been drinking because the officer knew
defendant had past problems with alcohol. Referencing the testimony she had elicited during
Officer Manning's cross-examination, counsel argued the following points: (1) only Officer
Manning, alone among his fellow officers with specialized training and who were positioned
closer to defendant, detected the odor of alcohol on defendant, (2) for no special reason the
officer especially remembered defendant as opposed to other customers, (3) Officer
Manning, contrary to his initial testimony, really knew that defendant drank, and (4)
defendant's movements in the store belied the officer's impression that defendant was
intoxicated (R. 165:182-84). In sum, defense counsel at trial plainly sought to discredit the
police, based on evidence of a biased attitude toward defendant, as she apparently intended
in moving to suppress evidence.
Even if this Court found that defendant's argument at trial was significantly
different than that defendant claims was presented at the suppression hearing but was
abandoned at trial, see Aplt. Br. at 8-10, defendant's claim would fail. First, "proof of
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality." State v. Coonce., 2001 UT App 355,^118,36 P.3d 533 (quoting Fernandez v. Cook,
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870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). "[Wjhere, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that
trial counsel was ineffective (and assuming defendant is represented by different counsel than
at trial), defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, f 16, 12 P.3d 92 (clarifying that if "defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support
a determination that counsel was ineffective,'... defendant bears the primary obligation and
burden of moving for a temporary remand [under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure]").3 Cf. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 23, 9 P.3d 777 (finding record
sufficient to evaluate trial counsel's tactics based on record developed following rule 23B
hearing). "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed
effectively." hither land, 2000 UT 76, at \ 16.
In this case, defendant has failed to bring up the transcript of the suppression hearing
or develop additional evidence concerning counsel's strategy under rule 23B. Defendant can
only speculate about why counsel at trial might have deviated from her strategy at the
suppression hearing. It is therefore impossible for this Court to intelligibly conclude that
counsel did not reasonably abandon any argument allegedly made in support of the motion
to suppress.
Additionally, even if this Court found that defendant's one-page suppression motion
(R. 27) adequately announced a distinctly more forceful attack on the police than was
3

Defendant was represented by Karen Allen at trial and is represented by Julie
George on appeal (R. 12, 143).
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presented at trial, defendant's claim would fail. To prove deficient performance, ''appellant
must demonstrate that counsel's actions were not conscious trial strategy, and that there was
a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Windward, 941 P.2d
627, 633 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In so doing, the
defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689(1984).
Defendant has not presented any credible argument that counsel could not have
reasonably consciously abandoned a virulent and inflammatory attack on police integrity
at trial that purportedly had already been presented to a trial judge at the suppression
hearing and failed (R. 39). In fact, the evidence at trial indicates that such an attack at trial
would likely have backfired because the evidence showed that the police did not allow
defendant to leave Pinn Willies knowing that he was intoxicated. Rather, they were unable
to accost him before he left and only reasonably suspected that he was intoxicated (R. 165:
72-73, 78-80, 94, 124). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, counsel appears to have made
a very reasonable decision to abandon a factually unsupported defense of police malfeasance,
based on the trial court's denying the motion to suppress.
In any event, defendant's claim that counsel was deficient in failing to request a public
intoxication instruction, either as a theory of defense or as a lesser included offense
instruction, see Aplt. Br. at 9-10, fails. Again, defendant has not developed any record
evidence that trial counsel did not consciously and reasonably choose to not request a public
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intoxication instruction. Therefore, counsel's actions should be construed as effective
performance. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at ][17. Also, as noted above, the theory of the
defense at trial was that defendant was not intoxicated. See State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52,
If 39, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 25(counsel not required to request a lesser included offense
instruction that is inconsistent with the defense). Therefore, counsel might reasonably have
believed that a public intoxication instruction would offer the jury an unwarranted avenue
for conviction.
More importantly, defense counsel does not perform deficiently in not requesting an
instruction to which defendant is not entitled. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^ 34, 989
P.2d 52 (noting trial counsel's decision to forgo futile acts does not amount to ineffective
assistance). The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
One of the foundational principles in regard to the submission of issues
to juries is that where the parties so request they are entitled to have
instructions given upon their theory of the case; and this includes on lesser
offenses ifany reasonable view of the evidence would support such a verdict.
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 154 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis partially in
original) (quoting State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811,812 (1970)). The
public intoxication statute provides: "A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the
influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the property of
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1) (1998) (emphasis added).

Because there is no evidence

whatsoever that defendant disturbed other persons in Pinn Willies, defendant was not entitled
12

to a public intoxication instruction. Consequently, defense counsel was not ineffective in
failing to request that instruction.
Finally, this Court may decline to consider defendant's entire claim of ineffective
assistance because defendant has failed to make any serious argument that he was prejudiced
as a result of his counsel's alleged deficient performance.4 Defendant's entire argument on
prejudice consists of two sentences:
Finally, [defendant] argues that but for the failure on the behalf of trial counsel
the result in his jury trial would have been different. Mr. Killian is sure that
he would have been found guilty of public intoxication and the jury would
have seen through the set up by the police officer had defense counsel been
more vigilant.
Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant having renounced the burden of analysis and argument, this Court
should decline to consider his claim.
In any event, it is plain that defendant was not prejudiced by any failure of trial
counsel to defend him by maligning the police officers. "To establish the prejudice prong
[of ineffective assistance of counsel], the defendant must show ca reasonable probability
exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different.'" State v.
Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Lovell 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah
1988)). "'"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

4

See rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas,
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately briefed claim under
rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not "'a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research'") (quoting State v. Bishop, 753
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted).
13

the outcome/"" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State \\
Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)), affd
2000 UT 10,994 P.2d 1243. In determining whether an error was harmful, a court considers
a number of factors, including "the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004,1011 (Utah App. 1994). "The
more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful error." Hamilton, 827
P.2d at 240.
In accord with the statute in effect at the time of the offense, September 2001, the jury
was correctly instructed that defendant could be found guilty of driving under the influence
of alcohol if he was operating a vehicle and (1) had "sufficient alcohol in his body that a
chemical test given within two hours of the alleged operation or physical control show that
he had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater;" or (2) "was under
the influence of alcohol... to a degree which rendered [him] incapable of safely operating
a vehicle" (Jury Instruction #8, R. 86).5
The evidence is overwhelming that both statutory alternatives were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Defendant stated on the DUI admonition form that he had been driving
to a friend's house on Highway 87 at 1:45 p.m. (R. 165:114-15). The breathalyser test was
administered to defendant at 2:55 p.m. (R. 165:108-09). Troopers Stradinger and Halfcock,
both certified to operate the properly functioning breathalyzer, testified that the results of the
5

Drivine under the influence of alcohol is provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 416-44 (2)(a). Subsequent to defendant's committing the offense, subsection (2)(a) was
amended to eliminate the requirement that defendant's blood or breath alcohol content be
measured within two hours of the vehicle's operation. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp.
2002) amendment notes.
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breathalyser showed defendant's alcohol reading was 169, more than twice the legal limit
of 08 (R. 165:107, 113, 157-60,162; State's Exhibit 4). Also, based on the smell of alcohol
coming from the defendant and his performance on the field sobnety tests, Trooper
Stradinger concluded that defendant had "too much alcohol in his system to safely operate
a motor vehicle" (R. 165:103-04). On the other hand, there was no evidence that the officers
maliciously set defendant up for an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
In sum, because there was overwhelming evidence that defendant, without police
instigation, was guilty of the charged offense, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's
defense strategy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j±

day of March, 2003
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were hand delivered to Julie George, attorney for appellant, 32 Exchange Place, Suite 101,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this j % _ day of March, 2003.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance
with Section 62A-8-107;
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse
m accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
and
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
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(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given
within two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
grams or greater; or
'ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
<b> The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
'3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than
24 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program,
or home confinement, the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (4)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance
abuse treatment is appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
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(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than
240 hours; or
(a) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13)
f c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program,
or home confinement, the court shall.
(0 order the person to participate in a screening and assessment,
(u) order the person to participate in an educational senes if the
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (5)(d), and
(in) impose a fine of not less than $800
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance
abuse treatment is appropriate.
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony
if it is committed:
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this
section; or
(n) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after
July 1, 2001.
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
d) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised followthrough after treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the
court may require the person to participate in home confinement through
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a
sentencing court to order a convicted person to* participate in a
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment, obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment, or do a combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44 6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).
(a) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in
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connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and
assessment, educational series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to
pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs,
the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a failure to comply.
Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and i3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol,
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with
the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this Subsection (9Xb) of the consequences of a violation of
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted
for the first time under Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed
within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the
court under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those
persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this
Subsection (12Xb), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for
a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall
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alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcemeat units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b» The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
11) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
id) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may
be monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
id) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during
the time the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel
directly between those activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers
by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation;
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation
provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence,
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that
sentence or those conditions or orders.
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)ld)(i).
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher,
then if the court does not order:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d>, or i6)ib)(iii),
then the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the
record:
(I) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or

(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, * 34; C. 1943,
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75,
§ l;1967,ch.8M 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977,
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63,
* 2;1982,ch.46,§ 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983,
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46,
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29;
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2;
1988, ch. 17, $ 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990,
ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168,
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32;
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996,
ch. 71, § 1; 1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223,
§ 2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998,
ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 33,
§ 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch. 258, § 1;
2000, ch. 333, § 1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001,
ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289, * 1; 2001, ch. 309,
§ 1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment by ch. 226, effective May 3, 1999, deleted
Subsection (6XaXi), making class A misdemeanors an alternative classification; deleted Subsections (6XaXiiXA) and (B), relating to three
and two prior convictions, respectively; deleted
former Subsection (6Kb), relating to fines, jail
sentences, and alternatives to jail sentences;
inserted "or 53-3-231" in Subsection (llXb); and
made designation and stylistic changes.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 258, effective
May 3,1999, rewrote Subsection (2XaXi), which
read "has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control," and
made stylistic changes.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 33, effective July
1, 1999, added Subsections (4)(bXii) and
(5XbXii), making related changes; inserted "or
home confinement" in Subsections (4Xc) and
(5Xc); added Subsections (6Xd) (Subsection
(6Xc) in the reconciled version) and (13); and
made related changes throughout the section.

The 2000 amendment by ch 333, effects
May 1, 2000, substituted "a substance abuse
testing instrument" for "an alcohol detection
breathalyzer" m Subsection <l3Hd)in ar\<i
added Subsection (14) (Subsection '15* in the
reconciled version).
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334. effects
May 1, 2000, rewrote the section, adding
providions for educational series, substance
abuse screenings and assessments, substance
abuse treatment programs, and supervised probation and added Subsection r14)
The 2001 amendment by ch. 64, effective
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (6)(a), added the
(i) designation, deleted "third or subsequent"
before "conviction," substituted "Violation of
Subsection (2)" for 'Violation," added Subsection (6)(aXii), and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 289, effective
April 30, 2001, made the same changes as ch.
64 and also substituted uten years" for "six
years" in Subsections (5Xa), (6XaKi), and
(llXaXii).
The 2001 amendment by ch. 355, effective
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(e), added "(i)
Except as provided in Subsection (4)(eXiif and
added Subsection (4XeXii) and in Subsection
(HXa) added the reference to Section 41-6-44 6.
The 2001 amendment by ch. 309, effective
July 1, 2001, added Subsection (3XaXiiXC) and
inserted aor two years" in Subsection (12)(a).
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Coordination clause. — The amendment
by Laws 1999, ch. 33 included changes in Subsection (6Xb) similar to the changes made by
that act in Subsections (4Xb) and (5)(b), but ch.
33, § 3 directs that the passage of ch. 226 causes
the amendments to Subsection (6Kb) in ch. 33
to be deleted from the act.
Croat-References. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or
placement in detoxification center.
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic
vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other
persons.
(2) A peace officer or a magistrate may release from custody an individual
arrested under this section if he believes imprisonment is unnecessary for the
protection of the individual or another; or a peace officer may take the arrested
person to a detoxification center or other special facility as an alternative to
incarceration or release from custody.
(3) When a person who is at least 13 years old, but younger than 18 years
old, is found by the court to have violated this section, the provisions regarding
suspension of the driver's license under Section 78-3a-506 apply to the
violation.
(4) When the court has issued an order suspending a person's driving
privileges for a violation of this section, the person's driver license shall be
suspended under Section 53-3-219.
(5) An offense under this section is a class C misdemeanor.
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Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact,
necessary for the appellate courts determination of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true.
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellants brief. Upon a
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be
filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a> and (b) of this rule
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim ot
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the
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ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of
reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellants attorney of record on
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or
retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand,
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties
or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact.
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result,
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals.
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.)

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1> A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the app>eal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph 111 >
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e> of this
rule.
(8> Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument i& arranged.
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(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding.
(10» A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum
shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the courts
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
( D a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph <a> of this rule. In cases invoking cross-appeals, paragraph <g> of
this rule set* forth the length ot bnefs
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(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeal* If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a bnef
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellants opening bnef. The appellants second bnef shall not exceed 25
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellants
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise.
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1. 1995; April 1, 1998
November 1, 1999.)
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — Rule 24
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P2d 1343,
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745
P2d 1276 1278 (Utah 1987). T o successfully
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate
counsel must play the devil's advocate ' must
extricate from the client's shoes and fully as^ume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge the duty , the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every >crap of competent evidence introduced
at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists "ONEIDAISLIC,
i OXEIDA
Cold Storage and Warn house lm , 872 P2d
1051. 1052-53 (Utah App 1994> (alteration in

original) (quoting West Valley City L Majestic
Inv C o , 818 P2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App 1991
See also State ex rel MS. i Salata. 806 P2a
1216, 1218 (Utah App 199V. Bell i Elder 7*2
P2d 545. 547 (Utah App 1989), State i Moore
802 P2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App 19901
The brief must contain for each is>ue rais^
on appeal, a statement of the applicable -tan
dard of review and citation ot >upportm£ u
thonty
A m e n d m e n t Notes. - The 1998 amend
ment added the second sentence in S u b d m ^
<e) concerning published deposition* or trJ
scripts
1
The 1999 amendment added the last ^
tence in Subdivision <a»<9>

